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Executive Summary the technology is not basic anymore, it requires large amounts of capital to be scaled up notably in biotech and lifescience, but its markets prospects remain too uncertain to attract standard financial instruments.
Hence the need to design specific financial instruments which will allocate appropriately the risk and provide the right incentives for all parties is a prerequisite for attracting more private capital in
TT. This paper presents some of these possible instruments, putting them in the context of the European Investment Fund activities. Direct support to Technology Transfer, Pre-seed and Seed, Business Angels, and incubators are important instruments; notably through a more active commercialisation of intellectual property (IP). IP management has to be integrated in these strategies from the outset, as IP is a major instrument for transferring knowledge and generating revenue.
1. Innovation and the Knowledge Economy
Where is Lisbon?
According to the European Commission, "Europe's research and industrial base suffers from a series of weaknesses. The greatest perceived weakness, however, is Europe's comparatively limited capacity to convert scientific breakthroughs and technological achievements into industrial and commercial successes" (e.g. European Commission 1994). This assessment has served as major catalyst for making innovation policy a strategic priority for the EC. In its broad-based innovation strategy for the EU, the importance of improving knowledge transfer between public research institutions and third parties, including industry, has been identified by the EC as one of the key areas for action (European Commission 2007b) and reiterated in its recent review of the
EU innovation policy (European Commission 2009).
There is the well-known Lisbon-objective that the EU shall become in 2010 "the most competitive knowledge-based economy of the world" (Lisbon Summit 2000) with expenditures of 3% of GDP for R&D. However, with only a few months left in 2009 and despite increased financial efforts and structural reforms implemented in several countries during the past years, Europe has not significantly improved its competitive position (Guellec and Sachwald 2008 ). Europe will not be able to meet the target in 2010, so what is necessary to improve the situation in the future?
Strengthening EU invention capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition as already stressed by Schumpeter (1951) "Economic leadership must be distinguished from invention. As long as they are not carried out into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant". Future growth will be determined by the Schumpeterian entrepreneur being able to transform the invention and new knowledge into practice through innovation. In this context, the term "marriage of new knowledge with its successful introduction into the marketplace" is often used (e.g. Baumol et al. 2007, p. 5 ).
Innovation is key
Hence, stronger innovation is the key element. The Oslo manual (OECD, Eurostat 2005) defines
Innovation as "the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relation. The minimum requirement for an innovation is that the product, process, marketing method or organisational method must be new (or significantly improved) to the firm". 2 It is -to say it with Peter Drucker's words -the change that creates a new dimension of performance.
The sources and conditions for innovation are variegated. Many innovations, notably nontechnological ones (marketing, organisation, distribution etc.) come directly from the effort of firms and specialised in-house departments implementing their own ingenuity. However, many other innovations proceed from inventions, often based on R&D performed by high-tech firms or universities. They are more intensive in scientific knowledge, they are often more radical or disruptive (transformative of market conditions). This demonstrates the importance of a highquality, vibrant university sector which performs the best basic research.
The issue in those cases is how to bring the invention from the lab to the market, gathering both the funding and the knowledge transfer which are required. This is all the less trivial when the invention is made in a university (as opposed to a corporate) laboratory, which usually does not have the skills and incentives to transform the invention into an innovation. The two issues, raising capital and transferring knowledge, cannot be addressed separately: designing the right incentives and sharing risk optimally between the parties requires the two aspects to be solved simultaneously, using then appropriate intellectual-property (IP) and financial instruments. This is the focus of the rest of this paper.
Small is beautiful -but so is large
Innovation is important for SMEs and corporates -and SMEs and corporates are essential for innovation. Empirical studies show that innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) grow faster and create more jobs than non-innovative SMEs. They are the so-called Gazelles. project. These ideas have also been discussed by Galbraith (1952) and Arrow (1962) . Policy measures should recognise that large firms are essential for the innovation system. The recent trend of concentrating resources on SMEs ignores the natural ecology of industry. An often neglected target group is the medium-sized firm above the SME threshold. This category probably has the greatest potential for increasing R&D spending but has also been struggling to do so in recent years (Aho 2006 ).
The contribution of small and medium-sized innovative firms is also key for large firms: many of the smaller firms are acquired at some stage by large ones, which use them as a source of radical innovations that the more closed and stratified context of large firms does not facilitate. At the same time, access to the funding, manufacturing and distribution capacities of a large firm allows in many cases to leverage the innovative performance of small firms. In the information technology or biotechnology sectors this dynamic has been essential to industrial development.
The reasons why Europe is currently not able to meet the Lisbon goals have been discussed extensively in various reports (see e.g. Guellec and Sachwald 2008; Aho, 2006) . The connection between academia, which generates new inventions, and the business sector, which can transform them into innovations is too weak. Innovative businesses face difficulties to access capital and markets; reasons are risks, external benefits associated to R&D programmes, and the cost structure (high fixed costs, low marginal costs). Hence the need for new financial instruments as part of public policies to boost technology transfers between universities and businesses and to ease the setting-up of new businesses exploiting university inventions. Such an evolution should be connected to Europe's own ability to turn new ideas and inventions into products and services responding to client needs. In addition, the European technological landscape is still mainly supply-side oriented partially due to the lack of adequate matching interfaces between the supply and demand for scientific knowledge.
Knowledge exploitation
Dissemination of created knowledge and commercialisation of IP rights are closely connected to the different phases of growth of technology start-ups. They broadly evolve through the following phases of development from downstream to upstream investment:
• "Technology transfer" phase: from invention and IP generation to business concept, proof-of-concept phase and first customers;
• "Venture" phase: developing a product line, broadening the customer base and establishing a full-fledged business;
• "Expansion" phase: Once the business opportunity is proven, the business needs to expand, distribution channels need to be set up, marketing efforts need to be developed and large-scale production capabilities need to be put in place.
Across Europe, it is often the first and third phases that are most difficult to finance. 
Converting research into products
Technology transfer (TT) can be broadly defined as the process of converting scientific findings from research organisations into useful products by the commercial sector. TT is also known as "knowledge transfer or knowledge sharing". This is the process whereby an enterprise converts scientific findings from research laboratories and universities into products and services in the marketplace. 4 TT can take three main channels (Figure 1 ):
• The creation of new companies (spin-outs), which often involves some transfer of personnel (mobility of researchers);
• Collaboration between universities, research organisations and industry notably via research contracts; and/or • Licensing of IP. Various types of licensing are practiced, including unilateral licensing, cross-licensing and patent pools, all of which involve an agreement by the owner of a patent (licensor) to allow another party (licensee) to make, sell and use the patented invention on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, without transferring ownership of the patent. Usually, a licensor receives financial rewards in exchange for the licence, typically in the form of royalty payments. Licensing is therefore one suitable mechanism for transferring technology between licensors who want to leverage their technological assets and licensees who want to complement their internal technological capabilities.
The advantages and disadvantages of licensing can vary from one case to another. In some cases, a patent licence itself is not sufficient to enable a licensee to bring a new product or service to the market because additional know-how is needed, in the form of documentation, software, samples, training and consulting services. As will be explained in Section 3, the size and evolution of technology licensing markets is difficult to measure. Accounting rules do not require firms to disclose patent licensing revenues as a separate item in corporate reports, and although most OECD countries have regulatory requirements for reporting licensing contracts, these are mostly related to cross-border transactions, and data are published only at an aggregate level. As a result, disclosure of patent licensing activity depends largely on firm policy. Even though disclosure of information on licensing revenues has been shown to have a positive effect on investors, most firms choose not to make such information public. Hence, available data on patent licensing is limited, scattered, and lacking in uniformity in spite of demand for more systematic data by policy makers, investors and academics.
One of the most direct benefits of patent licensing is generating revenue for the patent holder. In recent years, a number of firms have been able to generate considerable royalties from outward licensing of technology. IBM Corp., which started to more actively manage its IP rights in the late 1990s and obtained more than 3,000 US patent grants per year on average between 2000 and 2004, received more than USD 1bn in annual revenues from licensing royalties and sales of IP rights; about half of these revenues came from licensing. Other technology-intensive firms also report significant amounts from patent licensing.
Licensing appears to be concentrated in high-technology sectors. In an OECD survey, respondents from the ICT sector were the most likely to report increases in outward licensing (about 80 percent of respondents),
suggesting that outward-licensing has become an important source of revenue for ICT firms. In contrast, respondents from the pharmaceutical industry were most likely to report increases in inward-licensing (about 80 percent of respondents), reflecting the trend of licensing-in from small biotechnology firms. International licensing also appears to be on the rise and accounts for a significant share of total patent licensing.
Receipts from world-wide licensing appear to have grown steadily since the mid-1980s. While receipts remain considerably higher in the United States than in the EU or Japan, growth rates in the latter have The TT "funding gap" thus generates a disconnection between early basic research and downstream development. Typically basic research and early target discovery are mainly funded by government grants (sometimes also through philanthropic research funds). Once a technology has reached the proof-of-concept stage, in late preclinical testing in the case of biotech for instance, venture capital (VC) and licensing funds become available and are supplemented by private equity, public offerings and late stage licensing as the technology progresses towards commercialisation. The "funding gap" arises in between, the point where government and philanthropic funds begin to run out but the technology's risk profile still discourages VC and licensing investments.
The TT funding gap has been around for some time, but was magnified after the stock market and VC downturn in 2001 and also in the current crisis. Generating a successful initial public offering (IPO) or trade-sale exit for a venture capitalist has become more difficult, which in turn has put increased pressure on associated royalty rates and spin-out terms. As venture capitalists have become more conservative, moving new technologies from public funding to proof of concept has become more challenging.
With regard to the financial gap between the R&D patenting stages and the development (of prototypes, test series etc.) and the stage of commercialisation, the difficulty to assess the value of patents limits the advance toward the production stage. To adequately quantify the value of patents and patent portfolios, the licensing potential needs to be analysed. However, selling and buying technology is not costless; for example, initial investment is frequently needed to screen and identify a licensee, an outlay which patent holders are rarely willing to make due to uncertainty on their licensing potential. Patent Value Funds attempt to uncover both the financial gaps faced by the IP holders and their licensing potential. These are institutional funds that invest in patent portfolios, acting as intermediaries, making IP sellers and buyers meet and pulling off contracting easier to both parties. Therefore, TT can be envisaged as an intermediary institution for technologies and innovations aimed at facilitating the commercialisation and use of IP generated mainly in the research sector. But there is no evidence of an optimal spin-out level or an optimal licensing level. According to another line of argument, it is difficult for European Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) to find licensing partners for their technologies and they are instead progressing via spin-outs. In a way, European TT offices might be constrained to create the institutional partners (companies) that they do not find readily on the market. Survey evidence for the US shows that researchers often lack the interest to participate in TT (Siegel et al. 2003; . Theoretical work by and Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) shows that well-defined licensing contracts can help in this respect by providing the right incentive mechanisms to ensure inventors' cooperation in the disclosure of an invention and its later commercialisation. Lach and Schankerman (2008) find strong empirical support for this intuition and show the importance of well-devised inventor royalty sharing rules for university performance in terms of licensing. 7 Based on a panel of US universities they find that universities giving a higher share of royalties to the inventor generate more inventions and higher licensing income. This incentive effect appears to work both by inducing the sorting of scientists across universities and by increasing scientists' efforts. TT outcomes are also a function of commercialisation strategies. Licensing provides the most common mechanism for TT but spin-out companies have become increasingly popular.
Licensing agreements tend to work best in established TT offices with access to well-funded research projects. By contrast, spin-out ventures tend to be more prevalent in markets where research funds are more limited and where commercial licensing partners are less willing to share risk on academic research discoveries. However, licensing statistics have to be read carefully -survey results of higher licensing income can be attributed to the higher average age of (US-) university license portfolios. In addition, in the US, licensing income is highly concentrated, with a small number of universities, both private (Harvard, Stanford) and public (the University of California system) making the bulk of the market.
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But university patents are not only about creating financial or market value. For example, university patents play an important role in creating knowledge spillovers, building networks with other academics and venture capitalists and catalysing university-industry recognition (Striukova 2009b ).
• The key role of the intermediary structure. Successful technology transfer not only depends on the quality of the research and the involvement of the inventor, but crucially also on the size and the experience of the TTO. Among others, Siegel et al. (2003) Moreover, geographical differences in regulations 8 and location contexts have a significant impact on TT practices and results.
• The characteristics of public research institutions. A number of recent empirical studies have found that the size of the university, as measured by the number of academic staff is positively related with the amount of technology transfer (e.g. Belenzon and Schankerman 2008) .
Besides size, previous research finds that the research quality of the university also matters.
Universities producing higher-quality research, as measured by the quality of their doctoral programmes, generate more licenses and higher licensing income as shown by Chukumba and Jensen (2005) . Thursby and Kemp (2002) further suggest that the portfolio of disciplines present at the university could also play a distinctive role as some sciences are more likely than others to produce research that can be transferred to industry. Recent empirical studies find support for this hypothesis and show that the presence of biomedical and engineering faculties appear to be associated with higher levels of patenting and licensing activity (e.g. (Adams and Griliches 1998; Siegel et al. 2003) . Beyond these differences in the level of efficiency Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that scientists at private institutions are more responsive to royalty incentives. The wealth of private universities (endowment) and different criteria for the selection of researchers could explain this difference in responsiveness.
Lach and Schankerman 2008
• Clusters, proximity and openness still matter. Existing research suggests the importance of geographic concentration for successful university-industry relations ( • Is Europe so different from the US? US TTOs are more effective in generating invention disclosures, patent applications and grants than their European peers. However, European
TTOs appear to require a smaller level of research expenditure to generate licensing agreements and start-ups than their US peers. The share of licensing revenue for university TT as a percentage of research expenditure is around 1% in Europe but closer to 3% in the US.
One explanation for the lower licensing returns is a greater reliance on start-ups in Europe.
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Higher start-up activity and relatively low licensing activity in Europe is also to be put in relation with the lower royalties available for academic inventors in Europe compared with the US. A second explanation could be the advanced market-readiness of projects in the US:
The Lambert Review criticises too little licensing and too many unsustainable spin-outs (for the UK): "(… ) there are signs that the pendulum has swung too far and that too many spin-outs are now being created, some of low quality (… ). Despite a fall in 2002, many more spin-outs are created as a proportion of research expenditure than in the US and Canada. (… ) but these spin-out rates come at a cost to licensing. (… ) nine new university technologies are licensed for every spin-out that is formed in US, compared to only four in the UK." (Lambert Review of Business 2003, p. 58f.) However, the Lambert Review's criticism, that undue focus on spin-out companies has negatively affected technology licensing, has been addressed in an article by Ederyn Williams (Warwick Ventures). He shows that the poorer performance of UK universities in generating licensing income can be entirely attributed to the higher average age of US university license portfolios (Library House, 2007) .
• Projects at US universities are better financed and further developed towards their relevant markets than in Europe.
Improving gap of exploiting the whole range of technology) leads to many opportunities to develop innovative funding, both SME-related and project-related instruments.
The financial instruments in these markets -and these are not the standard VC tools -are not yet fully developed. However, discussions over the last years with market players from different sectors have made it clear that a sizeable potential for specialized investment companies exists. This is true for the seed stage, but also for the full exploitation of IP.
The financial crisis has further intensified the "traditional" funding issues for the exploitation of R&D. In general, there has been (and still is) a sharp decline in private-equity fundraising activities; early-stage VC is currently more stable than other phases, but also at a much lower level than before. Reasons for the sharp slowdown of fundraising activities are mainly uncertainty due to the ongoing crisis, the strong level of activity in previous years (2005 to 4.1 Financial design: Privileged access to deal flow and "Bears' hugs"
TT operations are often organised in partnership with research centres, universities or other structures. In this context, successful operations often benefit from privileged access to spin-outs originating from such innovation centres. Fostering and maintaining privileged relationships with those centres does not always make it possible (let alone desirable) to press for the typical governance/structuring features of VC, such as arms' length principles, conflict of interest parameters etc. This is a departure from standard structuring features and requires a specific approach and skills for successful implementation. In fact, the further upstream the project in the investment spectrum, the less certain standard features of equity investing are applicable -they can even become outright damaging, much like debt standards when applied to equity. The issue is about risk: At this intermediate stage, technology is more developed than basic knowledge but it is not developed enough yet for its market applications to have the degree of certainty that standard capital providers require. Appropriate solutions must be found which address the specifics of this market segment rather than trying to superimpose solutions which work in other environments.
Implementation issues -private co-investors
TT investing is an emerging area within finance. Consequently, it is not an established asset class among "market-oriented investors" -to an even more significant extent than technology VC which itself is increasingly shunned by the private sector. As regards structuring, limits in the level of public investment at first closings of funds are often an obstacle. Typically this specific rule is a legacy of VC or other private-equity investment guidelines, which is ceteris paribus applied to TT as if it was the same market segment. At the time of writing, market conditions are such that EIF and similar investors are often led to take up to 50 percent of first closings in their VC and privateequity investments. Therefore, an emerging area such as TT could greatly benefit from a similar approach.
Business development effort and lead-time
This is an emerging market, which lacks existing teams periodically submitting well-structured investment proposals. This mirrors the funding gap at this stage. EIF's role is to partner with leading research and innovation organisations in order to develop products and approaches resulting in "investable" operations by EIF and other investors. This resource-intensive, "tailormade" approach entails a high attrition rate, which is counterbalanced by the fact that it positions EIF as the partner of choice with leading innovation centres.
Longer time horizons: Average size currently smaller than other areas
Successful TT investing requires a long-term approach, with fifteen, twenty year (and beyond)
horizons being sometimes necessary. Also, the average size of investments in this area can be significantly smaller than in the typical private-equity operations.
Potential activities to meet market needs
Investing in support of knowledge transfer from universities to industry calls for new financing models which could address both the information and risk patterns of this activity (in-between public and market research). The availability of such instruments is a necessary condition for attracting larger amounts of private capital without which inventions cannot be transformed into innovations. In order to meet the markets' needs, public support should be provided through a flexible tool set, adapted to a variety of situations and needs. The remainder of the section explains potential future options for the EIF. 
Extension of current

Licensing operations
In TT through licensing, the IP developed within a research organisation is "licensed" by the research organisation to a production company. This license can be exclusive or not, is often limited to certain market segments or countries as well as in time. The IP can potentially also be acquired by the company. Because of the portfolio aspects as well as long lead times, "licensing" or "royalty" market segments lend themselves to complex financial engineering encompassing securitisation techniques and secondary approaches, which can be a more efficient form of funding than equity. Projects funds Shares some features with upstream VC. However, investments are made not in a company but in projects. Overhead costs are initially low because it can be decided at a later stage whether to commercialise the IP through licensing or through a spin-out. The ownership of the IP developed within these projects needs to be contractually agreed upfront. Similar to some existing university proof-of-concept funds.
IP funds
Investments are made into individual IP assets (e.g. patents), which have a potential to be commercialised. Different investment strategies can be applied. One strategy consists in buying portfolios of existing but (nearly) unused patents, often in batches at reduced prices. Grouping individual patents into "patent families" (or bundles) can be valuable to potential buyers (or licensors) of the technology by allowing them to fully protect their use of key technologies. Another strategy consists in selectively acquiring clusters of patents and building project teams around these technologies to further develop them to the point where they are attractive to commercial buyers. Such funds contribute to transferring existing IP assets into the commercial world.
Royalty funds
Fund buys the rights to the future royalty streams linked to a specific patent of or pools of patens. This is applicable for patents that are already commercialised (or close to commercialisation). By doing so, the fund increases the liquidity of the markets for patents.
IP line extension projects
Project financing is needed to develop further products on existing and already commercialised IP. The commercial use of existing IP-protected technologies can be extended with the development of tailored products for specific markets and customer profiles. Example: Schwarz Pharma asked for the financing of a clinical study in order to get market approval of a molecule already on the market for another indication. As a result, Schwarz would have been able to double revenues on their existing IP with only some minor IP extensions. An investor such as EIF could finance (part of) these developments in the form of project finance (also on a portfolio basis).
IP carve out projects
Spin-off or licensing-out of specific IP families that protect a potential new product from existing companies. Main driver is the lack of financing for second-line products which often bear higher potential than the first line but have more onerous product development. The cost of product development could then be addressed through TT financing, e.g. in the form of an SME or a special-purpose vehicle (SPV).
Secondary use of IP
Most (major) innovative companies manage their IP portfolio actively, often maintaining IP portfolios which are not in the (new) focus of the company. Also, stressed (tech) companies struggling for survival try to sell their IP when the underlying product development is at a too early stage but IP, know-how, skilled staff and results are in place. Acquiring the necessary IP and creating a new appropriate structure is a potential target of a TT transaction.
Corporate venturing and larger commercial Technology Transfer operations
Corporate venturing or corporate VC can be defined as the practice whereby a large firm takes an equity stake in a small innovative or specialist firm to which it may also provide management and marketing expertise. The objective of corporate VC is to gain a specific competitive advantage as well as to achieve a return. Corporate funds focusing on early-stage investments can be used as a tool to gain access to new technologies, often developed in the research organisations relevant to the industries on which the corporate venture fund focuses. In some cases the fund may also invest in companies spun out of the parent organisation, for instance to commercialise IP in an industry segment not relevant to the parent organisation. Corporate venture funds can be managed by teams which are still strongly linked to the parent company or by teams held at arms length. Some corporate funds attract third-party investors at fund level. The individual ticket size of this type of transaction is larger than for the other TT activities described in this section.
University seed funds
Another area of development consists in supporting numerous university (pre)-seed funds. These funds are often in collaboration with a single university and managed by a small local team. In this area, the return expectations are very limited. However, these funds play an important role in the creation of numerous technology spin-outs and, hence, significantly contribute to the commercialisation of academic research. This approach could be taken to a higher level, through operations bringing together several universities in order to create more sizeable spin-out fundssuch funds could operate in physical or virtual clusters possibly extending across different EU countries.
Conclusion
Global 
